Does decentralization strengthen or weaken the state? Authority and social learning in a supple state by Faguet, Jean-Paul et al.
  
Jean-Paul Faguet, Ashley M. Fox and Caroline Poeschl 
Does decentralization strengthen or weaken 
the state? Authority and social learning in a 
supple state 
 
Working paper 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Faguet, Jean-Paul, Fox, Ashley M. and Poeschl, Caroline (2014) Does decentralization 
strengthen or weaken the state? Authority and social learning in a supple state. Department of 
International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
Originally available from London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60631/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2015 
 
© 2014 The Authors 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
DOES DECENTRALIZATION STRENGTHEN OR WEAKEN THE STATE? 
Authority and social learning in a supple state 
 
 Jean-Paul Faguet1,2 Ashley M. Fox3 Caroline Pöschl4 
August 2014 
 
Abstract 
We examine how decentralization affects four key aspects of state strength: (i) Authority over 
territory and conflict prevention, (ii) Policy autonomy and the ability to uphold the law, (iii) 
Responsive, accountable service provision, and (iv) Social learning.  We provide specific 
reform paths that should lead to strengthening in each.  Decentralizing below the level of 
social cleavages should drain secessionist pressure by peeling away moderate citizens from 
radical leaders. The regional specificity of elite interests is key.  If regional elites have more 
to lose than gain from national schism, they will not invest in politicians and conflicts that 
promote secession.  Strong accountability mechanisms and national safeguards of minority 
rights can align local leaders’ incentives with citizens’, so promoting power-sharing and 
discouraging local capture or oppression.  “Fragmentation of authority” is a mistaken 
inference; what decentralization really does is transform politics from top-down to bottom-
up, embracing many localities and their concerns.  The state moves from a simpler, brittler 
command structure to one based on overlapping authority and complex complementarity, 
where government is more robust to failure in any of its parts. Well-designed reform, 
focusing on services with low economies of scale, with devolved taxation and bail-outs 
prohibited, should increase public accountability.  Lastly, by allowing citizens to become 
political actors in their own right, the small scale of local politics should promote social 
learning-by-doing, so strengthening political legitimacy, state-building, and ‘democratic 
suppleness’ from the grass-roots upwards.  
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1. Introduction 
Many developing countries are caught in a vicious circle of poverty, weak institutions, 
corruption, low levels of legitimacy and low economic growth rates. Decentralization has 
been widely advocated as a way out of this trap, and was exceedingly popular during the 
reform era of the 1990s and since. It has been promoted as a means of strengthening the state 
for developing countries suffering from low organizational capacity, poor public service 
provision, and sectarian violence (Brancati 2004). The policy response has been highly 
enthusiastic, with most of the world’s countries experimenting with some form of 
decentralization over the past three decades (Manor 1999). 
This is ironic, as a strong state has traditionally been equated with a centralized state. 
Strong states were understood as unitary rather than federal, with power concentrated in the 
executive branch (Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1985; Skocpol 1985). Such centralized 
states were generally considered to be better able to formulate policy independently and carry 
out specific goals without obtrusion. They were seen as exercising greater control over their 
populations, ensuring conformity in legal mandates and concentrating power at the top of the 
chain of command, giving them greater authority (Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1985; 
Skocpol 1985). 
But the appeal of the ‘strong state as centralized state’ idea diminished during the 
1990s, at the same time that decentralization was becoming the new consensus (Stepan 
2000).  Proponents argued that decentralized governance structures may actually be more 
effective in strengthening the state. While centralized states are strong in some respects, they 
may be “brittle” in others (Faguet 2013a & 2013b). They may stoke tensions amongst 
fractious groups, leading to violence. They may be unresponsive, inefficient or wasteful in 
the use of public resources. And they may facilitate tyranny of the majority or elite capture on 
a national scale. 
Has decentralization lived up to this potential? Or has reform instead weakened state 
institutions, giving voice to disparate and competing factions? Traditionally – and oddly – the 
literature has been unable to answer these large questions (Treisman 2007, Faguet 2012).  But 
a surge of new evidence from diverse countries provides a basis for settling some of these 
disagreements, and also correcting some of the fundamental misunderstandings in the 
literature about what decentralization is and how it affects the state. This chapter uses such 
evidence to reconceptualize some of the key tradeoffs regarding decentralization and state 
strength, and then offers practical guidance to assist development scholars and policymakers 
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in navigating the potentials and pitfalls of reform. We review both the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the ways decentralization is believed to either strengthen or weaken 
the state, highlighting where theory is indeterminate, and focus on the underlying conditions 
that can cause the same reform to have very different outcomes. We suggest policy and 
structural factors that policymakers can use to design sincerely5 decentralized institutions that 
strengthen the state and promote its legitimacy. 
Just as the flexibility of an aircraft’s wings increases the aircraft’s resilience through 
their capacity to dissipate shocks, we argue that decentralizing a state may increase its 
strength by making it more “supple”. By increasing the density of government structure in 
terms of elected local and regional representation, decentralization can generate more 
feedback loops and increase the overall level of accountability to which government is 
subject. This serves to both increase the state’s sensitivity to local complaints and conditions, 
and increase its options for response through overlapping responsibility and multiple 
redundancy in the policy realm. Simply put, in a centralized system a citizen has one 
authority to appeal to. In a decentralized system she has several, each with its own powers 
and independent incentives to listen. All else equal, she is more likely to get satisfaction for at 
least some of her concerns in the latter. And by bringing government “closer to the people”, 
decentralization may increase participation in state-building processes from the ground up.   
We make this argument piecemeal.  We focus on some of the most important 
components of state strength identified in the literature, link these to the principal challenges 
facing weak states in developing countries, and then analyze how decentralization can affect 
each one. The major arguments are summarized in Table 1. Section 2 discusses some of the 
most important conceptualizations of state strength in the literature and identifies four key 
dimensions that should be affected by the level of (de)centralization in a country’s 
government.  Section 3 examines how decentralization might affect a state’s authority over its 
territory and people, and its ability to maintain peace and prevent conflict.  Section 4 
discusses whether decentralization increases or decreases the state’s ability to formulate 
policy autonomously and uphold the law.  In Section 5 we consider whether decentralization 
can make public services more responsive and accountable to citizens.  Section 6 delves into 
a potentially powerful effect that has received very little attention – social learning through 
democratic practice, and how decentralized government can achieve it in ways that 
                                                 
5 ‘Sincere’ decentralization refers to authentic attempts to devolve power and resources to subnational 
levels of government, as opposed to declarations of intent, or even promulgated laws and decrees, that have little 
practical effect (Faguet 2012). 
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centralized government cannot.  We conclude with specific recommendations of policy and 
structural factors that can guide decentralization processes towards state-strengthening, and 
not state-weakening, outcomes. 
2. Defining state strength and decentralization 
What is a strong state? Though many scholars have considered the question, there is no 
agreed-upon understanding (see e.g., Kocher 2010; Mkandawire 2001). Numerous labels and 
analogous concepts have been used, including state capacity (Migdal 2001), state autonomy 
(Geddes 1996), state efficacy (Delacroix & Ragin 1981), good governance (Kaufman and 
Kraay 2002), state weakness, failed states (Esty et al 1997), fragile states, resilient states and 
developmental states (Putzel and DiJohn 2012; Johnson 1982), among others.  Most 
definitions of state strength tend to comprise a list of partly overlapping but sometimes 
contradictory components or characteristics (Kocher 2010). Bräutigam et al (2008), for 
example, define state capacity as the administrative, fiscal, and institutional capacity of 
governments to interact constructively with their societies and pursue public goals 
effectively.  Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) define state efficacy broadly in terms of 
the efficiency of the bureaucracy and public servants, roles and responsibilities of local and 
regional governments, including the administrative and technical skills of government, 
effectiveness of policy and program formulation, governing capacity, and effective use of 
resources.  Fukuyama (2004) distinguishes between two dimensions that have often been 
confounded in definitions of state capacity – state strength versus state scope. He argues that 
the hallmark of “stateness” is its enforcement functions, rather than the scope of activities 
performed.  
While each of the many terms and definitions encapsulate nuanced differences, several 
common components of state strength can be derived. Strong states are typically 
characterized as being able to establish authority over their territory and population. Several 
definitions draw from Max Weber’s (1946) definition of a state as an entity that successfully 
has monopoly on the legitimate use of force over a territory. Often cited is the ability to 
maintain order, preventing large-scale violence, civil war and secession. Many other authors 
measure a state’s strength by the degree to which it is able to enforce the law, implement its 
policies, and react to external shocks. While some definitions list the ability of adopting 
decisions autonomously, independent of social groups, others emphasize the salience of 
organizational capacity and a stable professional bureaucracy. A third thread focuses on the 
degree to which a state can respond to the needs of its citizens and provide basic services 
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such as water, sanitation, electricity, health and education. Other scholars analyze the state’s 
ability to extract resources, through taxation or otherwise.  A last consideration, which few 
scholars address but which is potentially powerful, is the extent of social learning that occurs 
in a state, which can increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of its actions. 
The sections that follow examine these key components of state strength or weakness as 
discussed in the literature, with specific bibliographical references, and discuss in detail how 
decentralization may impact upon them. In spite of much overlap across the components, 
they are put forward separately in the interest of clarity and presentational ease. Although the 
literature distinguishes several types of decentralization (Rondinelli et al. 1983; Faguet 2012), 
we focus on the variant that we consider to be analytically the most powerful and practically 
the most important. Decentralization is henceforth defined as a reform that establishes or 
increases the political power of subnational units via the devolution of power and resources to 
locally elected subnational officials. This is different from administrative deconcentration, 
where the central government delegates functions to local agents but retains decision-making 
control, from delegation, where managerial responsibility is transferred to organizations 
outside the regular bureaucratic structure, and from privatization, where state assets and 
responsibility for service delivery are transferred to the private sector. 
3. Authority over territory and people, maintaining peace, and preventing 
conflict 
One key component of state strength is the ability of the state to exert authority over a 
given territory and its population (e.g. Price-Smith, Tauber & Bhat 2006). Many developing 
states were born out of international agreements, often with arbitrarily defined borders based 
on colonial partition more than internal political factors, with little to hold them together 
beyond guarantees by the international system (e.g. Jackson & Rosberg 1986; Englebert 
2000; Herbst 2001). They exist de jure but, unlike European states in which power over a 
territory and its population generally came first and sovereignty and international recognition 
followed, many developing countries have not been able to consolidate power in order to 
achieve the internal consent or territorial reach necessary to exert authority over the entire 
state (Jackson and Rosberg 1986). This is a fundamental problem facing many African 
leaders (Herbst 2001; Englebert 2000).   
The state may instead be made up of different ethnic groups spread over sometimes 
vast geographic areas, each with its own customs, language, and culture. A consciousness of 
common nationality is often lacking. Citizens do not feel represented by the government and 
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perceive that leaders cater mainly to people of their own tribe or region, rather than to all 
citizens equally. In addition, parallel or rival forms of authority (e.g. traditional chiefs, 
religious leaders, or drug lords) may supersede the authority of the state (Myrdal 1968).  The 
discussion that follows highlights the close interconnections between a state’s authority over 
territory and people and its ability to maintain order and protect citizens from violence, as 
different aspects of the same dimension of state strength (e.g. Esty et al 1997; Homer-Dixon 
1999; Migdal 2001; Price-Smith, Tauber & Bhat 2006). 
3.1 Decentralization, self-determination and secession 
How might decentralization affect these challenges? First, decentralization may help 
mitigate them by bringing government ‘closer to the people’. When small subnational 
governments with decision-making powers are created throughout a country, citizens can 
more easily raise concerns with public officials; the closer government authorities are to 
them, the more they are likely to work with them (Faguet 2004a, 2004b, and 2012). 
Decentralization can thus give the state greater presence and reach, enabling citizens in every 
corner of the state to have their interests reflected in policy and public services. 
Similarly, bringing locally elected subnational leaders from different segments of the 
country into government, and thus giving representation to people of different groups, may 
incite parts of the population that formerly felt excluded from the state to feel represented and 
included. Indeed, federal, decentralized institutions have long been recommended as a 
mechanism to hold together fractured, “multi-national states” (Lijphart 1977; Stepan 2001; 
Horowitz 2003; Brancati 2004). Where divisions are defined territorially, decentralization is 
said to promote the formation of multiple but complementary identities where citizens can 
simultaneously carry both an ethnic identity and identify with the polity as a whole (Stepan 
2001).  Decentralization can thereby act as a pressure valve for nationalist aspirations. In 
Canada and Spain, for example, decentralization has been deemed a success in keeping 
fractious provinces like Quebec and Catalunya from seceding.  In the UK, the devolution of 
regional powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly was the critical element that made 
successful peace talks with the Irish Republican Army possible. 
But there are also many opposing arguments. Some claim that decentralization will 
build a federalist mentality, undermining efforts to build national unity and identity. It may 
even deepen divides between groups and intensify conflict by reinforcing cultural or ethnic 
identities. Second, decentralization may lead fractious groups to want ever more autonomy. 
In this vein, former British Prime Minister John Major argued against devolving powers to 
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Scotland, claiming it was “the Trojan horse to independence” that would lead to friction and 
eventually demands for full independence (Major 1995, quoted in Brancati 2009). Powers 
were devolved by the Labour government that followed, and a referendum for full Scottish 
independence has now been called for 2014. With more power and independence, 
decentralized areas may realize they can manage their affairs better on their own.  
Decentralization may give subnational leaders experience in governing. Several decentralized 
regions have seceded after first setting up their own decentralized institutions. South Sudan is 
one recent example. 
The key theoretical issue concerns whether decentralization will stoke centripetal or 
centrifugal forces.  Opponents of decentralization claim devolving power and resources will 
empower those who seek secession, and – if they prove reasonably competent – assuage 
citizens’ ill-formed fear of the unknown by showing them local authorities who provide 
services and manage public budgets adequately.  Proponents claim that the same stimulus – 
the devolution of power and resources to even secessionist politicians – will generate the 
opposite response.  Like an onion, it will peel away the outer layers of support from such 
leaders and parties, stripping them of constituents whose demands can be satisfied by more 
limited measures of autonomy, such as local control over public services, minority language 
rights, and symbolic goods such as public art and celebration, so isolating the hard 
secessionist core that seeks full independence from the mass of citizens. 
Which side of this argument is correct is not an issue of decentralization per se, but 
rather depends on the nature of the secessionist impulse and the source of such parties’ and 
leaders’ appeal.  Where groups are distinct, geographically concentrated, and highly 
mobilized against one another through violence, it may be difficult to imagine continuing 
cohabitation within a single nation, barring the comprehensive defeat of one group.  But 
where groups are harder to distinguish, or where they comingle, or where mobilizations are 
only partial, decentralization may offer the “steam valve” required to satisfy those who 
actually demand autonomy, not full secession, and hold a nation together. 
In practice, the more important factor is likely to be the regional specificity of elite 
interests.  If coherent regional elites (1) exist, and (2) have more to gain from secession 
(greater control over resources at the cost of lost markets and lost influence) than autonomy 
(partial control over resources, continued access to national markets and policy-making), then 
national integrity is in much greater peril.  Regional elites will have an incentive to invest in 
creating conditions propitious to national schism.  Beyond funding political parties and 
campaigns, this may well extend to supporting armed insurgencies and investing in the sorts 
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of violence against civilians that peace talks cannot later reconcile.  The recent history of the 
Balkans richly and sadly illustrates this dynamic. 
On the other hand, the evident success of both developed and developing federations 
that have strong regional identities but much stronger national identities, such as the United 
States, Germany, India, and Brazil, demonstrates that decentralized government can stitch 
together diverse countries in ways that lead to neither subnational tyranny nor secession.  One 
of the keys is regionally diverse elite interests.  There are undoubtedly powerful elites in 
California, North Rhine-Westphalia, Uttar Pradesh and Sao Paolo.  Any of these would rank 
as a medium-sized to large independent country in both population and GDP.  It would be a 
perfectly respectable country of important weight in the international system.  And yet 
secession is not seriously debated in any of these places.  Why don’t these states’ elites 
agitate for secession? 
Because their political and economic interests span state boundaries.  Business and 
political leaders in California and Uttar Pradesh have more to lose than to gain from splitting 
from the other 49 US or 27 Indian states, despite the fact that all of them are smaller.  Pulling 
up the drawbridges would leave elites in North Rhine-Westphalia and Sao Paolo 
unambiguously in control of a non-trivial country instead of a state.  But from their leading 
positions in these states, elites in all four exert considerable influence over much larger and 
more important countries.  And they have access to considerably larger internal markets, and 
can influence international treaties that give them better access to the world economy and a 
stronger voice in international affairs.  They benefit from the unity of a nation they can 
expect to sway and perhaps even lead.  They would lose from its breakup.  So they invest in 
unity, not division. 
Interestingly, Stepan (1999) argues that another deciding factor in the ability of 
federalist states to hold together fractious groups is the timing of elections. When elections 
are introduced in the subunits of a new federal polity prior to countrywide elections, and in 
the absence of countrywide parties, the potential for subsequent secession is high compared 
to when national elections are held first. National elections produce a sense of common 
nationality whereas subnational elections can generate fractious local parties. Of the nine 
states that once made up communist Europe, six were unitary and three were federal. 
Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia are examples of countries that first held 
subnational elections prior to national elections, and subsequently broke up into 22 
independent states. 
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Can decentralization be designed in ways that hold fractious groups together rather than 
promoting secession?  Yes – by decentralizing power and authority to a level below that of 
major ethnic, linguistic, or other identity groups.  In this way, empowered subnational units 
will tend not to be identified with group identity or privilege.  Rather than stoking divisive 
tensions, local government will instead become identified with issues of efficiency and 
service provision.  In a country where an ethnic minority is concentrated in one region, 
decentralizing to the regional level is far more likely, all else equal, to reinforce ethnic 
divisions and place authority and resources in the hands of those with most to gain from 
national breakup.  Decentralizing to the local level, by contrast, will create many units of any 
given ethnicity, and most likely others that are mixed.  No level of government will be 
associated with any particular ethnicity, nor with ethnicity per se.  Comparisons across local 
governments will tend to focus more on issues of competence in service provision than 
identity, revindication, or pride. 
Complementary reforms that promote a single internal market for goods and services 
nationwide can also help by preventing the development of elites with regionally-specific 
economic interests who might gain from national schism.  These would instead be substituted 
by elites whose assets or historical bases might be in a particular region, but whose economic 
interests are multiregional, and who therefore have a strong interest in national integrity and 
growth.  Specific measures such as improved infrastructure and transport links can help bring 
this about, in addition to facilitating the flow of people and ideas across an economy, so 
binding it together from the bottom up. 
3.2 Decentralization and conflict 
The relationship between decentralization and conflict has long been a topic of debate 
(Green 2008).  Arguments overlap significantly with those on self-determination and 
secession, since the failure to integrate regions and minorities into the state is a key source of 
conflict.  As argued above, decentralization can accommodate diversity by giving territorially 
concentrated groups the power to make their own decisions about issues that most interest 
them (Tsebelis 1990; Lijphart 1996).6 This may diffuse social and political tensions and 
prevent conflict (Bardhan 2005). Giving groups control may protect them against abuse or 
neglect from the centre or from one another, which can cause conflict. For instance, if a 
group is experiencing economic disadvantage, it could be given the power to control its own 
resources and decide how to allocate resources.  If fear of social extinction is the cause of 
                                                 
6 As Brancati (2008) points out, this is less so for territorially dispersed ethnic or other groups. 
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conflict, it could be granted control over issues such as education, religion or culture in order 
to protect its language and customs (Brancati 2009). 
Others take the view that decentralization will instead lead to increased conflict with 
fractious groups. Roeder and Rothchild (2005), for example, contend that decentralization 
will give subnational leaders the resources and ‘institutional weapons’ they need to mobilize 
the local population and demand more political power from the center, thereby elevating 
tensions. Subnational leaders may also gain prominence and followers, and subsequently 
threaten the power of national political elites, again causing conflict. Some note that 
decentralization has produced local leaders who discriminate against minorities in their own 
regions (Herowitz 1991; Lijphart 1993). Brancati (2009), for example, points out that 
allowing parts of northern Nigeria to adopt their own (Sharia) law has aggravated rather than 
defused tensions between Christians and Muslims, when the Christian minority was forced to 
comply. This underlines the importance of protecting minority rights, which theorists going 
back at least as far as the Federalist Papers (Madison, Hamilton and Jay, 1961 [1788]), and 
including most major contributions since (see e.g. Dahl 1971 and 1989), have considered 
critical to the stability and sustainability of democracy as a form of government. 
How can decentralization be implemented so as to dampen, and not promote, conflict?  
Decentralized governments that are responsive to national minorities will drain tensions from 
the polity.  But local governments that become ‘little tyrannies’, ignoring or oppressing local 
minorities, will stoke tensions, threatening not just particular governments but the notion of 
democracy itself.  Hence decentralization should be designed with strong local accountability 
mechanisms that align local leaders’ incentives with the will of local citizens and allow voters 
to hold politicians responsible for their decisions.  And central government should enact 
strong safeguards of minority rights nationwide, to which individuals and groups can appeal 
in any locality. 
3.3 Decentralization as a power-sharing arrangement 
In a post-conflict environment, decentralization can be a key component of a power-
sharing arrangement that settles power struggles and ends violent conflict.  This operates by 
creating or empowering subnational levels of government to which political power and 
responsibility, and resources, are devolved.  In doing so it also creates new fora for political 
competition, and hence new prizes over which opposing parties can compete.  This solves the 
winner-take-all problem inherent to centralization, where parties in government wield huge 
central government resources and reap huge rewards, and opposition parties are left to wither.  
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In a federal system, by contrast, opposition parties can still win power over states and local 
governments (O’Neill 2003), and hence enhanced voice in national debates and opportunities 
to display competence in government.  The penalty of losing national elections is much less 
steep, and so the temptation to win at any cost greatly lessened.  This can help cement the 
peace in a post-conflict environment. 
Decentralization, for instance, has recently been advocated for Iraq and Afghanistan 
with exactly this in mind (Brinkerhoff and Johnson 2009; Barfield 2011).  Green (2011) 
explains how Ethiopia’s decentralization process in the 1990’s was part of a civil war 
settlement that successfully maintained the peace. The country was divided into 11 federal 
regions. This fragmented the political opposition, creating various new parties that competed 
against one another for power over the newly created regions, while preventing a return to 
conflict for power over central government. Peace was maintained and the government in 
power at the federal level remained free of coups (and electoral defeat). Such shifts in power 
arrangements can be used to diffuse power struggles at the top. But in other cases, 
decentralization may merely shift conflict downward rather than eliminating it altogether. 
Uganda’s government under President Yoweri Museveni implemented a decentralization 
program in 1986 in order to reduce national-level conflict. While successful in this regard, 
Green (2008) argues that the ultimate effect was to replace conflict at the top with conflict at 
the local level. 
Can decentralization be designed in ways that promotes power-sharing?  A properly 
operating decentralized system should naturally lead to the sharing of powers that have been 
devolved to different subnational levels of government.  Few additional reforms are required 
other than the avoidance of electoral and fiscal distortions.  In countries where politics is 
closed or captured, measures that promote open, competitive local politics will tend towards 
fairness and power-sharing, and away from capture and conflict.  Electoral finance laws that 
support a level political playing field have particular importance in this regard, as one of the 
most powerful and prevalent ways in which democracy is distorted is through the flow of 
money into campaigns.  Where political competition is open to new entrants and the playing 
field is level, elections will tend to be fought over issues of substance to local voters.  In such 
places, political conflict and violence will tend to transform naturally into electoral 
contestation, which is less risky for participants. 
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3.4 Decentralization as an institutional constraint on the regime 
Decentralization may also guard against the concentration of power of one group over 
other groups in the state (Leff 1999).  In Peru following Fujimori’s authoritarian regime, for 
example, a national consensus to decentralize crystallized around the desire to avoid a repeat 
of the abuses of overly powerful central government leaders through the safeguards and 
checks and balances that decentralization affords (de la Cruz 2004). 
But decentralization may also cause political fragmentation of the opposition, and this 
may help authoritarian rulers remain in power. Sabatini (2003) argues that decentralization 
has been used in Latin America to split opposition parties into numerous small, 
uncoordinated local parties as a method for remaining in power.  But the experience of at 
least two countries in Sabatini’s sample, Bolivia and Colombia, suggests that something 
deeper is at work.  The rise of local political competition that necessarily accompanies 
democratic decentralization undermines pre-existing national parties with weak local roots, 
and can generate many new, locally-based political parties with strong local roots.  But the 
experience of both countries suggests that strengthening the official party and fracturing 
opposition parties is at best a short-term, transition dynamic.  Over longer periods of time 
(e.g. two decades) some of these new local parties ally, federate, and otherwise morph into 
political organizations capable of contesting national elections.  And official parties with 
weak local roots also do not survive expulsion from power (Faguet 2012). 
What decentralization really does is to transform politics from an arena that is by 
definition national, top-down, and subject to oligopolization by a socio-economic elite based 
in a few powerful cities, to a meta-arena embracing many specific, local arenas where 
pressing local concerns are taken up and addressed, or not, by local politicians and the parties 
they choose to join.  This sort of bottom-up politics is characteristic of federal countries like 
the US, Germany, and India, and is in many ways the opposite of politics in a unitary state.  
The transition from the latter to the former will be treacherous for many existing centralized 
political parties.  That is an argument of interest, not of principle, against decentralization. 
Decentralization has been a relatively successful tool for deterring conflict in some 
countries (such as Canada, Spain, Belgium, India) but not others (Yugoslavia). What 
accounts for the differences? By empowering a new set of players, decentralization inherently 
shifts the intrastate balance of power. Power shifts and disruptions in political settlements can 
cause conflict (Putzel and Di John, 2012). And conflict can be stoked with a view to shifting 
the balance of power, as discussed above.  On the other hand, power shifts can also be used to 
diffuse conflict. The design of decentralization processes may play a role in their success or 
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failure as conflict mitigation tools, but it most likely depends on the specific power balance, 
and the political bargains and settlements of the players involved. Weingast (2013), North, 
Wallis and Weingast (2009) and Stepan (1999 and 2001), amongst others, examine this 
question.  It remains a complex, important area ripe for further research. 
4. Formulating policy autonomously and compelling compliance with the 
law 
Further important components of a strong state are the ability to formulate policy goals 
autonomously from particular groups in society (Vogel 1986; Evans, Rueschemeyer & 
Skocpol 1985; Evans 1992, Kohli 2004) and the capability of compelling compliance with 
the law or policies while remaining autonomous from social influence or competing authority 
structures (Kay 2003; Geddes 1996). Some scholars add to this the ability to guide the 
economy (Johnson 1982; Woo-Cummings 1999; Mkandawire 2001). 
The inability to implement goals or to police effectively, and the subversion of policy 
objectives by government agents (agency loss), on the other hand, are considered 
characteristics of weak states (e.g. Evans et al 1985; Engelbert 2000). Centralized states may 
have fewer players involved in the decision-making process, whereas decentralized countries 
with more than one level of government have more players involved (often a lower house) 
with veto powers. The command structure in centralized states has therefore been viewed as 
cleaner and decisions easier to execute, and execute quickly, than when certain decision-
making powers are moved to other levels. 
4.1 Decentralization and the command structure 
In contrast with the view that a strong state is, by definition, a centralized state 
(Skocpol 1985), a major promise of decentralization is that the more proximal command 
structure can produce better policy outputs by creating a closer match between local 
government outputs and local preferences (Faguet 2004a and 2012). The greater homogeneity 
of preferences at the local vs. national level allows local governments to tailor policy 
decisions and public goods more precisely to local needs and preferences than central 
governments typically manage. 
On the other hand, decentralization may bring about a certain loss of control at the top 
and an inability to act quickly or in concert. It may weaken coherence between local 
endeavors and national-level issues (Sabatini 2003; Treisman 2007). For example, it may be 
more difficult for the central government to exert fiscal discipline if it has granted spending 
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powers to subnational governments, leading to macroeconomic problems, as explained by 
Jaramillo and Grazzi (this volume) and Ardanaz, Leiras and Tommasi (2013). 
In fact, both claims are true.  Decentralization should not be viewed simplistically as a 
choice between “strong” centralized government and “weak” decentralized government.  It is, 
rather, a move from a centralized command structure that is simpler and cleaner, but 
ultimately more brittle in the sense of susceptible to failure in any of its parts, which will tend 
to lead to government failure, to a system that is more complex, based on more actors with 
independent sources of overlapping authority, where coordination and cooperation are far 
more important than command and control for the system as a whole to operate well.  This 
greater complexity is more difficult to manage, and coordination harder to achieve than 
command adherence.  But it also implies greater suppleness in the sense of robustness to 
failure in any of its parts, which – unlike centralization – need not be terminal for public 
services in the affected area.  Hence in a centralized system, corruption or ineptitude amongst 
the officials responsible for local education will have serious consequences for education in 
that locality. In a decentralized system, by contrast, the same failings in local government 
officials can be attenuated or even overturned by the actions of regional and national 
authorities, who share responsibility for local education. 
Local governments may also be more vulnerable to interest group capture of the local 
political process, and the distortions of political representation in small electoral 
environments. Where these phenomena exist, interest groups can gain a decisive influence 
over local government, and decentralization will tend to favor these small local groups 
disproportionately.  The logic is developed and tested empirically by Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (1999), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), Blair (2000), Crook and Sverrisson 
(1999), Dreze and Sen (1996), Manor (1999), and Prud’homme (1995), and is as follows.  
Local elites are “large” compared to local civil society and local governments, which will 
often be too weak to oppose them and may even internalize elite priorities as their own.  In 
such a context, decentralization can lead to weak local governments that are cowed and 
captured by local elites.  One effective remedy is a centralized state that is comparatively 
wealthy and powerful – “large” compared to local elites.  Decentralization will not lead to 
transparent, equitable local government because the local societies in which local 
governments operate are distorted by extreme inequalities of wealth and power.  And thus 
reform will lessen the transparency, responsiveness and accountability of the state. 
While this argument has much merit, it underplays the comparative threat that elite 
capture poses at the national level.  As Hacker and Pierson (2011) show, the much greater 
14 
 
rewards from distorting national policy-making lead the richest interest groups to invest 
enormous sums in capturing national government.  When successful, this gives such interest 
groups powers and privileges enormously greater than anything available through local 
capture, with potentially deleterious effects for an entire nation.  Elite capture is a real threat.  
But it is a threat for all kinds and levels of government.  It is not a special threat for 
decentralized government.  As argued below, political openness and competition are the best 
antiseptics. 
4.2 Decentralization, policy stability, and a stable institutionalized bureaucracy 
Several scholars mention the existence of an autonomous institutionalized bureaucracy, 
as opposed to personal rule or neopatrimonialism and systemic privatization, as the 
characterizing feature of a strong state (Kocher 2010). This is expected to achieve policy 
continuity, decisions that are more likely to be in the interest of society rather than based on 
personal relationships, stability of expectations, and an organized professional bureaucracy. 
States are considered weak when their political institutions—e.g., constitutions, electoral 
rules— are often altered and lack continuity or support. If the “rules of the game” change 
frequently, this is said to undermine confidence in the state and the state’s ability to make 
“credible commitments” (Levitsky & Murrillo 2009). For instance, term limits may be 
regularly changed by incumbents, constitutions may be rewritten frequently, or life tenure for 
judges may be ignored in practice (Levitsky & Murillo 2009). This instability and lack of 
institutionalization of rules and procedures undermines the ability of the state to generate 
shared behavioral expectations that shape and strengthen political structures. 
States that are captured by special interests are argued to be less effective at 
formulating and carrying out social policy designed to meet the public good (Cox & 
McCubbins 2001). Traditionally, centralized states have been viewed as more autonomous in 
their ability to formulate policy by diminishing the influence of particular groups in society 
(Vogel 1986; Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol 1985).  By fracturing centralized power, such 
authors argue, decentralization reduces the autonomy of the state and makes it more 
susceptible to personalistic, clientelistic forces. 
Proponents of decentralization contend that more players in the decision-making 
process may lead to greater policy stability, which in turn strengthens the state by making 
dramatic policy switches harder to achieve (Cox & McCubbins 2001). In fact, it has been 
argued that decentralized systems are stronger precisely because by increasing the total 
number of actors in government required to approve rules, laws and policies cannot be as 
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easily and frequently changed and greater stability is attained (Tsebelis 2002; Treisman 
2007). 
A better way of thinking about this is as a trade-off between the strength of the leader 
and the strength of the state as institution.  To the extent that the leader has more discretion, 
her power increases and she can effect greater, faster changes to public policy and 
organizations.  The leader is stronger at the expense of the state.  But where her discretion is 
circumscribed by rules, procedure, and the need to agree decisions with other independent 
actors in order to proceed, then the state is stronger and more stable at the expense of the 
leader.  By increasing the number of independent actors and requiring a measure of 
consensus amongst them for policy-making to proceed, decentralization weakens central 
leaders and creates or empowers subnational leaders, thus increasing the strength of the state 
by strengthening it institutionally. 
The relative autonomy of a centralized state may also come at the expense of 
efficiency. Although centralized states may be more autonomous in their ability to formulate 
policy, due to their relative isolation during this planning phase, they may face an uphill 
battle in implementing policies for which the participation and cooperation of other citizens 
and groups is necessary. As Grindle (1980) outlines, a central problem in implementation 
occurs when policies designed centrally are ill-suited to local conditions. For example, local 
implementers may need to appease local elites, who may stand to lose from certain programs.  
Opposition from such elites, especially in a context of inflexible implementation rules, will 
lead to dynamic inefficiencies as the policy is rolled out.  By granting opportunities for 
participation to regions and local governments in policy design, decentralized decision-
making will respond more precisely and dynamically to diverse local conditions, will tend to 
be regarded as more legitimate, and is likely to gain greater compliance from civic actors.  
Decision-making may be slower, but the resulting decisions are more likely to “stick”. 
Furthermore, in many highly centralized states local government structures are simply 
non-existent.  Exposure to new, vibrant local governments can strengthen the state by 
expanding its presence, providing citizens with more direct interactions with government and 
elections, thereby improving the perception of state responsiveness and enhancing the 
legitimacy of national governments. For instance, prior to decentralization most of the 
Bolivian countryside lacked any form of local administration that provided services or 
represented citizens.  Following decentralization, elected local governments accountable to 
local voters sprang up throughout the land.  In countless interviews, poor rural citizens 
responded to the question “How has decentralization affected your life” with assurances that 
16 
 
they finally felt Bolivian, that decentralization had given citizenship meaning, and that at last 
there was evidence that they mattered and the state cared for them (Faguet 2012).  In Bolivia, 
the spread of local governments, a stable local bureaucracy, and the services they provide 
have clearly strengthened the legitimacy of the state in citizens’ eyes. 
5. Responsive, accountable public service delivery 
Drawing again on Weber, another marker of a strong state is the ability to carry out 
policies in an efficient manner that is responsive to public needs (Bates 2008).  Providing 
basic services to the population is regarded as a basic function of the state, and the extent to 
which it achieves this may be regarded as a direct component of state strength. It may also 
indirectly contribute to state strength as success will likely enhance its legitimacy and 
authority. 
One of the most frequently cited and powerful arguments in favor of decentralization is 
that it will have a positive impact on public responsiveness to basic needs. By allowing 
government to tailor decisions to the specific demands and needs of the local population, 
decentralization facilitates matching resources with citizen needs more precisely and cost-
effectively. Additionally, competition between subnational governments for residents and 
investment may induce them to improve services (Tiebout 1956; Hayek 1939). 
Decentralization is further expected to enhance public services by improving 
accountability and responsiveness of the government to citizens (see Green, forthcoming). By 
bringing decision making power closer to the represented and creating popularly elected 
positions at the local level, incentives for accountability can be transformed (Faguet 2012). 
Rather than local officials being accountable mainly to their superiors in higher levels of 
government, they become accountable to their constituents as they become dependent on 
them for their votes and tax revenue. It is also generally easier for citizens to scrutinize, 
participate in, and make demands of nearby local administrations than of a distant central 
government in a far-off capital. In both Bolivia and Colombia, for example, such a shift in 
incentives and accountability relations has altered investment decisions and resulted in 
significant improvements in basic service delivery (Faguet and Wietzke 2006; Faguet 2012; 
Faguet and Sánchez 2013). In Ethiopia, too, decentralization from the 1990s devolved 
spending powers to the regions, allowing funds to reach many previously neglected poorer 
local governments (woredas) for the first time. The shift in spending decisions that resulted 
improved health and education indicators markedly (Rajkumar and Garcia 2007). 
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A related explanation of the benefits of decentralization for government performance 
rests on the ability of decentralized structures to leverage local social capital (Putnam 1993). 
A high density of civic organizations that encourage people to work together and build trust 
fosters behavior that makes for better performance in local institutions. Where social trust and 
civic organization are present, local government will have a strong tendency to respond to 
local needs more precisely and effectively, and work with less waste and corruption, than 
would otherwise be the case.  
However, while there is reason to believe that decentralization can foster local social 
capital by bringing governance closer to the people, proponents of social capital are skeptical 
that government policy can work to create this trust or build this capital. For instance, Putnam 
(1993) suggests that in Italy, areas which did not develop social capital in the Middle Ages 
are not likely to perform well in the twentieth century. Likewise, Fukuyama (2004) suggests 
that the success of certain public sector institutions in newly developed East Asian countries 
stems from their “mandarin bureaucratic tradition,” which cannot be easily replicated.  In 
fact, direct investment in civil society is seen as weakening the state by bypassing it 
(Fukuyama 2004). 
Other arguments counter the view that decentralization will improve government’s 
ability to respond to basic needs and services. These include the loss of economies of scale 
(Wallis & Oates 1988), and the possibility that decentralized funds may be more easily 
diverted or captured by local elites (Manor 1999). Opponents of decentralization argue in 
particular that the devolution of responsibility only increases the discretion of local elites in 
the distribution of public goods, and can strengthen patron-client relationships (Bardhan, 
Mitra, Mookerjee, Sarkar 2008). Also, subnational governments may not have the same 
technical or human capacity to provide services with the same efficiency and quality as 
central government (Treisman 2007). Studies of federal systems have tended to find that 
central governments are more effective at making equitable allocation decisions, especially 
for assisting the poor (Linz & Stepan 2000). And politically induced interregional inequality 
can lead to conflict, weakening the state. 
“Fiscal laziness” is another potential unintended consequence of decentralization, 
which can critically undermine state stability and strength (The World Bank 1994). State and 
local governments may have little incentive to match intergovernmental transfers through 
local taxation (Peterson 1994). If the ability to tax is a marker of state strength and legitimacy 
as some have suggested (Levi & Sacks 2009), this fiscal laziness could be consequential, 
laying the foundation for a less capable state. But it can also attack state strength directly, as 
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happened in Argentina in 2001 (Ardanaz, Leiras and Tommasi 2013).  There, the governors 
of certain poorer provinces who preferred to under-tax their populations were able to force 
central government to repeatedly bail them out via the requirements of the national 
congressional coalition.  This fed persistent unsustainable fiscal deficits, which ultimately led 
to the 2001 economic collapse. 
These risks can be combatted by decentralizing not only expenditure but taxation too, 
and prohibiting either bail-outs, local deficits, or both.  In such cases, local governments will 
have a strong incentive to tailor local policies and services to the priorities of those who pay 
(Faguet 2012). And citizens will have a greater incentive to monitor the use of funds.  Hence 
fiscal laziness is a problem not of decentralization per se, but of badly designed 
decentralizations, and can be remedied in a technically straightforward fashion by altering the 
subnational incentive structure (Ardanaz et al. 2013).  Likewise the question of loss of 
economies of scale can be addressed through well-designed decentralization.  A 
decentralization that loses important economies of scale is a badly designed decentralization.  
Any rational decentralized system will involve continuing co-production of public goods and 
services at the central, regional and local levels (Faguet and Sanchez 2013).  Goods with 
large economies of scale should be produced centrally, and those with significant 
heterogeneity or local informational inputs should be produced locally. 
Where elite or interest group capture is concerned, it is worth reiterating that this is not 
a particular problem of local or regional government.  Policy making in central governments 
as rich, powerful and professional as the United States can suffer from significant degrees of 
elite capture (Hacker and Pierson 2011). Empirical evidence shows that the way to combat 
this in a decentralized system is through open, free, fair political competition in a broader 
context of civic organizations and economic interests that interact extensively through 
politics (Faguet 2012).  So long as there is transparency in politics and the playing field is 
level, economic interests and civic groups will have strong incentives to interact with one 
another as they compete through politics to obtain amenable outcomes, and this interaction 
itself will tend towards responsive, accountable government and away from capture and 
tyranny. 
6. Social learning 
We have seen that well-designed decentralization can strengthen the state by averting 
secessionist tendencies and conflict, enhancing compliance with the law, and improving 
service delivery. We now turn to the a final ‘meta-issue’ or mechanism through which 
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decentralization can serve to strengthen the state.  Social learning has received far less 
attention in the literature.  But the effects of decentralization on state strength via social 
learning, although second-order, may ultimately be the most powerful considered here, not 
least because it operates through each of the first three components discussed above, as well 
as in other ways. 
The key to understanding social learning is that it occurs over time and thus requires 
dynamic analysis, unlike most of the literature which uses comparative static analysis to 
discuss decentralization’s effects on both technocratic (e.g. education investment) and 
governance-related (e.g. compliance with the law) issues.  Indeed, one of the overarching 
themes of this chapter is the need to analyze the effects of decentralization in a dynamic 
context, as decentralization is not a one-off change but rather a process that develops and 
matures over time.  Our treatment builds on Faguet’s (2012) analysis of the importance of 
interactions amongst social, private sector and political actors in the local political economy 
as critical determinants of responsive and accountable government. 
Decentralized government accelerates social learning over time in a way that 
centralized government does not and, for most people, cannot.  This is because decentralized 
government operates at a community level that is susceptible to personal action and initiative, 
as opposed to regional and national governments that operate through elected or delegated 
representatives, where agency is exercised through higher-order collectives.  The small scale 
of local politics allows citizens to become political actors either individually or through civic 
organizations.  Such organizations are often informal, with small or no budgets, and rely on 
volunteers to staff critical positions.  They are ideal entry-points for naïve citizens to first 
encounter politics, expose themselves to political debate and public decision-making, and 
become politically engaged. 
Social learning is a learning-by-doing phenomenon, and hence relies on direct 
interactions amongst citizens.  Local government provides ordinary citizens with real access 
to repeated interactions on matters of public policy and resources, both directly with the local 
government apparatus and indirectly through civic organizations that debate positions and 
compete with firms, other interests and each other to influence government.  It does so for the 
common citizen in a way that central government, with its high resource thresholds, 
professionalized organizations, formal and intricate rules and norms, and obscure jargon, 
cannot. 
To better understand this, let us follow Faguet (2004b) and consider some elemental 
tasks that are crucial to democracy, but which are commonly overlooked.  For democracy to 
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represent and then act on the will of its citizens in a way that is fair and responsive, it must be 
able to: (i) identify and articulate shared preferences and opinions, (ii) aggregate shared 
preferences, and (iii) enforce accountability.  Preferences can be thought of as wants and 
needs, some of which are individual and hence private (e.g. my favorite sandwich, my 
favorite shirt), and others of which are shared in society and so the object of public action 
(preferred quality of schools, preferred level of taxation). 
Consider how a new political idea arises in society.  Only some of an individual’s many 
needs and preferences are shared with others.  For politicians to be elected, they must identify 
those needs shared by the most voters, articulate them in ways voters find convincing, and 
propose viable policy solutions.  By making people realize certain demands are shared, 
politicians convert private into public preferences; they create political voice where before 
there was none. 
Once the public has been convinced that certain policy ideas are important, society 
must weigh competing demands and the tradeoffs they imply, and choose which options to 
pursue.  In other words, social preferences must be aggregated.  This is where political 
process and government come in, trading off the needs and demands of different groups, 
firms and organizations in the search for something like a social optimum.  This occurs most 
obviously through elections, where individuals vote for competing candidates offering 
different combinations of policies, and the most preferred wins.  But in a well-functioning 
democracy it operates in many other ways, continuously, at all levels of society. 
Once a polity has expressed its preferences, formed them into political options, and 
chosen which of these it wishes to pursue collectively, it requires mechanisms for holding 
politicians to account.  In a democracy, citizens must have levers of influence over elected 
officials that allow them to ensure that: (a) socially-preferred bundles of policies are 
implemented, (b) with reasonable efficiency.  Absent accountability, all the preceding is for 
naught – an illusion of democratic choice that confers little voice and no power to the people.  
Regular elections are the most obvious accountability mechanism by which voters can 
remove unsatisfactory officials from power.  But, again, there are others. 
Each of these processes – preference articulation, preference aggregation, and 
accountability – is necessary to democracy.  All three operate continuously, relying on 
government-society and society-society interactions for their success.  Civil society is 
conceived here as both individuals and the set of collectivities that aggregate their ideas and 
efforts, interacting amongst themselves and with the institutions of government.  Such 
organizations develop their own norms of behavior and responsibility organically, and over 
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time may build up stores of trust and credibility that enhance capacity, or not.  Governance 
relies on these autonomous organizations to mediate – and ultimately empower – citizens’ 
participation in the decision-making that governance implies. 
Why does decentralization matter?  Because scale is determinant and its effects are 
non-linear.  The large scale of central government demands disproportionately greater 
resources and levels of organization for effective engagement than does local government.  
Hence the autonomous organizations that populate the space between politicians and voters 
are open to citizen participation and agency at the local level, but closed to most citizens at 
the central level.  The overwhelming majority of citizens who might become participants in 
local governance must remain as voters, onlookers, and perhaps dues-payers where central 
government is concerned.   
Hence the experience of participation and engagement with public decision-making 
abounds in government in its decentralized, but not centralized, form.  And so experience 
accrues and learning occurs amongst individual voters and their small-scale collectives (e.g. 
civic groups, local lobbies) in local government, as opposed to think tanks, professional lobby 
firms, and peak associations in central government.  Participation in local government leads 
naturally to social learning around narrow questions of effectiveness, but also higher-order 
learning about fellow citizens’ needs, resource constraints, and the multiplicative effects of 
public as opposed to private action for certain classes of problems.  The experience of 
working together teaches people to work together better.  A gradual convergence of 
individuals’ perspectives around local needs and service standards ensues, generating greater 
political legitimacy.  Initial impulses to conflict and contestation can be transformed into 
regularized interaction and cooperation, which induces stores of trust that can be drawn on 
when real conflict threatens.  The workings of central government, by contrast, tend to 
reinforce the organizational, technical and financial advantages of highly professionalized 
groups, thus deepening the chasm between policy-making and the ordinary citizen. 
Decentralization and local government can thus promote political legitimacy and long-
term state-building from the grass-roots upward in a way that centralized government cannot.  
This is the deeper meaning of a state that is ‘democratically supple’, introduced above.  But 
we see now that ‘suppleness’ is far more than the linear concept of ‘more elected officials’.  It 
is, additionally, the greater degree of organization that decentralization catalyzes in a society 
by providing strong incentives for group formation and strong incentives for organizational 
effectiveness.  And it is the iterative experience at the level of individual citizens of 
interacting with others to define and solve collective problems that makes future such actions 
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easier, more reliable, and more easily sustained – through the simple fact of having done it 
before.  As a result, democracy as a method of choosing leaders and arriving at collective 
decisions is deepened, substantively improved, and made more legitimate in the eyes of 
voters who engage in it directly, locally. 
The dynamic described above should operate naturally in a sincerely decentralized 
system; little is required additionally in terms of complementary reforms or institutions other 
than the absence of active distortions.  Our main recommendation follows logically from the 
analysis: Reformers should decentralize to government units sufficiently small for individuals 
and their voluntary organizations to actively participate in decision-making and regularly 
impact outcomes.  The degree of non-linearity of resource and organizational thresholds 
required for effectiveness will vary by country and level of development.  But for a “typical” 
developing country, a local government in which citizen participation is viable might number 
in the tens of thousands of inhabitants, as opposed to hundreds of thousands or millions.  It 
should also be sufficiently geographically compact that an ordinary citizen at one edge of a 
local government has some direct knowledge of how her similar at the other extreme lives. 
This raises the difficult issue of metropolitan governance in a decentralized system.  
Urban giants such as Cairo, Mumbai, and Sao Paolo represent a large and increasing share of 
the  population and economic output of the developing world; any one of these is larger in 
both dimensions than many small countries.  They are natural political as well as economic 
units, but their scale dwarfs the idealized parameters outlined above.  How can a 
decentralized system incorporate such behemoths?  Unfortunately, this complex issue lies 
beyond our scope.  We limit ourselves here to note that the government of large urban areas 
requires asymmetric approaches to decentralization, permitting different rules for different 
sizes and types of local governments.  Large cities, for example, may require decentralization 
to the sub-municipal (e.g. district, ward) level in order for its full benefits to be captured.  
Further detailed treatment of this and related questions can be found in Bahl, Linn and Wetzel 
(2013), Ahluwalia, Kanbur and Mohanty (2014), and Rao and Bird (2011). 
7. Conclusion 
The academic literature contains different definitions and conceptions of a strong state. 
We argue in favor of the following key identifiable, intellectually discrete components of 
‘state strength’: (i) Authority over territory and conflict prevention, (ii) Policy autonomy and 
the ability to uphold the law, (iii) Responsive, accountable service provision, and (iv) Social 
learning. Theory is indeterminate on the impact of decentralization on the first three 
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components, and the fourth has been largely ignored. But a surge of evidence over the past 
two decades from real policy experiments provides a basis not only for settling theoretical 
disagreements, but for reconceptualizing decentralization’s effects on the state in 
fundamental ways. 
Where authority over territory, self-determination and secession are concerned, the key 
question is whether decentralization will stoke centripetal or centrifugal forces.  We argue 
that a well-designed reform that decentralizes power and resources to a level below that of 
major social or regional cleavages is most likely to identify local government with issues of 
efficiency and service provision, as opposed to social identity and grievance.  Such a 
decentralization can undermine secessionist movements by peeling away layers of support 
from citizens whose demands can be satisfied by more limited measures of autonomy.  In 
practice, a key factor will be the regional specificity of elite interests.  To support national 
integrity, regional elites must be made to have more to lose than gain from national schism, 
so that they do not invest in politicians, parties and events (including violent ones) that 
promote national breakup.  Complementary reforms promoting a single internal market for 
goods and services, and improved infrastructure and transport links, can help convince elites 
that continued access to national markets and policy-making trumps dominance of local 
resources and power.  Such reforms can also facilitate the flow of people and ideas across an 
economy, binding it together from the bottom up. 
By reducing secessionist tensions, decentralization designed in this way should also 
reduce the threat of conflict in a society.  Strong local accountability mechanisms combined 
with strong national safeguards of minority rights can help by aligning leaders’ incentives 
with those of local citizens, preventing subnational governments from ignoring or oppressing 
local minorities.  These should be paired with electoral measures that support open, 
competitive local politics on a level playing field, and campaign finance regulations that 
support transparency and fairness, so promoting power-sharing and discouraging capture. 
Interestingly, the literature is ambivalent about whether decentralization should 
strengthen or weaken the central state.  Some argue that it will fragment political opposition 
to authoritarian rulers, thereby strengthening their centralized control.  Others argue that it 
will bring about a loss of control at the top by creating new centers of power and 
complicating a simpler, ‘cleaner’ command and control system.  We argue that both 
perspectives are wrong because they fundamentally misunderstand one of decentralization’s 
central effects. 
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What decentralization really does is to transform politics from a top-down, national 
arena subject to oligopolization by a small urban elite, to a bottom-up meta-arena embracing 
many specific, local arenas where local politicians are pressed to address local concerns.  It 
represents a move from a simpler command structure that is ultimately more brittle in the 
sense of being susceptible to local failure, leading to government failure, to a system based 
on more actors with independent sources of overlapping authority, with complex 
complementarities amongst them, which as a whole is more robust to failure in any of its 
parts, and hence more supple.  Decentralization strengthens the institutions of government, 
their accountability and legitimacy, at the expense of central leaders’ discretion.  We think 
this is a good trade-off. 
But will politicians?  It is probably safe to categorize national leaders into two groups: 
(i) those who are primarily self-interested, and (ii) those whose self-interest is tempered by a 
concern for the common good, or their place in history, which may be observationally 
similar.  Leaders who are primarily self-interested will tend to keep power and resources in 
their own hands.  If they decentralize, such reforms will tend to be “paper decentralizations” 
of form, not substance, or perhaps outright mistakes.  As argued in chapter 1, the first kind 
probably accounts for a large share of the world’s decentralizations.  And the second kind is 
strictly irrational, perhaps the product of calculative mistakes, and so not a good subject of 
analysis. 
Category (ii), by contrast, is far more interesting.  Leaders with at least some concern 
for the collective good (or their place in history) may well decide that decentralizing power 
and resources is the superior alternative.  As Faguet (2012) stresses, decentralization is not a 
switch that can be flipped, but rather a process that consolidates over time.  A leader who 
announces decentralization at the start of her term is likely to see it fully implemented only 
towards the end of her term.  Reform is likely to constrain her successors far more than 
herself.  In many political contexts, this may in itself be an appealing prospect.  And history 
will credit her, not her successors, for the initiative.  Furthermore, as we saw in chapter 2 for 
the case of Bolivia, if the leader’s party has a strong subnational presence, then reform will 
tend to appeal to the larger number of party members who are regional or local – but not 
national – party figures. 
This implies that the apparently deep paradox of self-interested politicians who devolve 
power to others may, at least sometimes, actually be a logical response to objective 
opportunities.  Let us assume a leader with long time horizons (i.e. ‘a place in history’) who 
privately believes that decentralization can improve governance.  What will she do?  Real 
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power and authority would drain much more from future leaders than from her.  And where 
the party is well organized, her followers would be rewarded with the creation of many 
subnational offices that they will disproportionately win.  These considerations transform 
reform from ‘paradoxical’ to ‘attractive’.  Furthermore, her substantive belief and her concern 
for the future make it far more likely that the reform she pursues is sincere.  Rather than an 
historical aberration, Goni Sánchez de Lozada is thus a good example of a class of rational 
leaders with a strong party and an eye on history. 
Whether or not decentralization will increase the responsiveness and accountability of 
public services is another major cleavage.  Proponents claim that taking government “closer 
to the people” will transform public incentives from upward-looking to the bureaucracy to 
downward-looking, to voters.  Opponents counter that local governments are more 
susceptible to interest group capture, and suffer from lower economies of scale, lower 
technical and human capacity, and a tendency to fiscal laziness.  We argue that these 
objections are not problems of decentralization per se, but rather of badly designed reform.  
They can be overcome in a technically straightforward way by decentralizing only activities 
with low economies of scale, devolving taxation, and prohibiting bail-outs and/or subnational 
debt. 
Lastly, we develop the concept of social learning in a decentralized environment.  The 
small scale of local politics allows citizens to become political actors either individually or 
through their civic organizations.  It provides ordinary citizens with access to repeated 
interactions on matters of public policy and resources, both directly and indirectly through 
civic organizations that debate positions and compete with firms, other interests and each 
other to influence government.  In this learning-by-doing fashion, it makes citizens better at 
democracy across all stages of the formation and aggregation of public preferences, and the 
enforcement of accountability.  It promotes political legitimacy, long-term state-building, and 
‘democratic suppleness’ from the grass-roots upwards in a way that centralized government, 
with its comparatively high resource thresholds, professionalized organizations, formal and 
intricate norms, and obscure jargon, cannot. 
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Table 1: Summary arguments – Does decentralization strengthen or weaken developing states? 
Components of State Strength  Strengthen Weaken 
1. Authority over territory and people, maintaining peace, and preventing conflict 
Decentralization and the ability to 
hold together fractious groups 
Decentralization and federalist 
institutions act as a pressure valve 
to alleviate ethnic tensions. 
Can reinforce cultural or ethnic 
identities leading fractious groups 
to demand ever more autonomy, 
with the potential for secession. 
Recommendation: Decentralize below the level of major groups, so that decentralized 
government is identified with service provision and not group identity or 
privilege.  I.e. if ethnicities are concentrated in regions, decentralize 
down to the municipal level. 
 
Complementary reforms that promote a single internal market for goods 
and services. 
 
Improved infrastructure and transport links that help integrate people 
and the economy. 
Decentralization and conflict Decentralization reduces pressures 
for conflict by empowering and 
including local minority groups 
whose concerns are often ignored 
by the center, and makes the state 
more accountable to them. 
Encourages separatism. Empowers 
chauvinist leaders to discriminate 
against local minorities. 
Recommendations: Strengthen democratic local accountability in subnational units and 
implement strong central safeguards of minority rights to which 
individual and groups can appeal, to protect against decentralized 
governments becoming little tyrannies. 
Decentralization as a power-
sharing arrangement 
Decentralization can end the 
winner-take-all problem by shifting 
power and resources to subnational 
governments that opposition 
political parties can win control of. 
Can shift conflict to the local level 
rather than eliminating it. 
Recommendation: Complementary reforms that promote open, competitive local politics, 
especially electoral finance laws that support a level political playing 
field, can help turn conflict and violence into electoral contestation. 
Decentralization as an 
institutional constraint on the 
regime 
Decentralization can guard against 
the concentration of power of one 
group over other groups in the 
state. 
 
Can cause political fragmentation 
of the opposition, which can be 
exploited by authoritarian rulers to 
remain in power. 
Recommendation: Given open, competitive politics, a fragmentation of the opposition that 
strengthens the official party is a short-term dynamic at best.  In the 
longer-term, decentralization is likely to transform politics, and all 
parties, from a top-down into a bottom-up activity with strong local 
roots. 
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2. Formulating policy autonomously and compelling compliance with the law 
Decentralization and the 
command structure 
Due to greater homogeneity of 
local preferences, local decision 
making can avoid the policy 
deadlocks that occur among more 
heterogeneous preferences at the 
centre. 
Weakens centralized control 
mechanisms and the chain of 
command. Increases the chances of 
elite capture. 
Correction & 
Recommendation: 
The question is not “strength” vs. “weakness”, but rather of a move from 
a simpler, clearer but more brittle centralized system of command and 
control, to a more complex system of overlapping authority that demands 
coordination amongst multiple actors to operate well, but is more supple 
and robust to failure in any of its parts. 
 
Elite capture is always a threat for all kinds of government. 
 
Openness and competition are the best counter-measures. 
Decentralization, policy stability, 
and a stable institutionalized 
bureaucracy 
A greater number of actors in the 
decision-making process leads to 
greater policy stability, making 
dramatic policy switches harder to 
achieve. 
1. Multiple interests at different 
levels weaken state autonomy 
and increases clientelism. 
2. Policy implementation may 
be hampered if the 
preferences of local 
government conflict with the 
preferences of the center.  
Corrections: 1. A better way to view these issues is the strength of leaders vs. the 
strength of the state.  Decentralization strengthens the state by 
strengthening subnational actors and the systems in which they 
operate.  This comes at the expense of leaders’ discretion. 
2. This is equivalent to arguing “Central government should decide 
without local input”.  The point of decentralization is give local 
preferences some, as opposed to no, systemic weight. 
3. Responsive, accountable public service delivery 
Decentralization and responsive, 
accountable public services 
Local democratic decision making 
is more responsive and 
accountable, and thus better 
matches local government outputs 
to local preferences.  
Local governments may be more 
vulnerable to interest group capture 
of the local political process, and 
the distortions of political 
representation in small electoral 
environments.  Economies of scale 
will be lost.  Technical and human 
capacity is lower subnationally.  
Local fiscal laziness can 
undermine state stability. 
Recommendations: Interest group capture is a threat to governance at all levels of the state.  
Open, free and fair political competition and the presence of an active, 
free press are the best guarantees against capture by any single group or 
interest. 
 
Decentralize goods and services with low economies of scale; retain 
production with high economies of scale centrally. 
 
Decentralize taxation as well as expenditure, and prohibit bail-outs. 
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4. Social learning 
 
Decentralization and social 
learning in a dynamic context 
By reducing the scale of 
government, decentralization 
makes it possible for citizens and 
their voluntary associations to 
participate directly in government.  
This in turn generates social 
learning at the individual and 
group level, which improves 
democracy substantively and 
strengthens its legitimacy in 
voters’ eyes. 
No such learning occurs, and so 
the additional costs of a 
decentralized administration are 
uncompensated by benefits. 
Recommendation: Decentralize to local units small enough that individuals and voluntary 
groups can actively participate and regularly affect decision-making. 
 
Open, free and fair political competition and the presence of an active, 
free press are the best guarantees against capture by any single group or 
interest. 
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